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NO FEES PLEASE: A DEFENSE OF THE AMERICAN RULE IN 
TRADEMARK AND PATENT CIVIL ACTIONS 
Joseph M. Esposito* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Imagine that you are a small-time inventor seeking a patent for your 
new, groundbreaking invention.  As an initial matter, I commend your 
inventive spirit, and would mention that you are in good company.1  Before 
you may claim protection for your creation, you must submit your 
application to the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) so 
that it can be reviewed and approved.  The required information regarding 
your patent seems limited, and although you feel what is requested from you 
is not fully sufficient to display the uniqueness and innovativeness of your 
invention, you adhere to the process.  After determining which application 
fits your particular needs, you send your application and eagerly await its 
approval.2 
DENIED.  Surely this can’t be right?  You have the opportunity to have 
your application reexamined,3 and feeling confident that a mistake has been 
made, you request such reexamination.  A single rejection of your creation 
surely is not enough to defeat your spirit. 
DENIED.  One denial may have been a lark, but two?  Your invention is 
groundbreaking! How could they not see the uniqueness and potential of 
your creation?  In the back of your mind you may be concerned that your 
invention isn’t as original as you initially thought, but have no fear, for the 
code allows for another appeal.  This time, the appeal is to the Patent Trial 
 
* J.D. Candidate, 2020, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., Pace University; M.B.A., 
Pace University.  I would like to thank Professor Timothy Glynn for his guidance.  I would 
also like to thank my parents, Frank and Toni Esposito, for their endless love and support. 
 1  The USPTO recently celebrated the issuance of its ten millionth patent.  U.S. DEPT. 
COM., 10 Million Patents: A Celebration of American Innovation, USPTO (June 14, 2018), 
https://www.commerce.gov/news/blog/2018/06/10-million-patents-celebration-american-
innovation. 
 2  There are four different types of patent applications available, depending on what an 
applicant seeks to patent and in what form.  See Types of Patent Applications and 
Proceedings, USPTO, https://www.uspto.gov/patents-getting-started/patent-basics/types-pat 
ent-applicationsproceedings (last visited Sept. 24, 2019). 
 3  35 U.S.C. § 132(a) (2018) (“[If after receiving notice of rejection, and] the applicant 
persists in [his or her] claim for a patent . . . the patent shall be reexamined.”). 
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and Appeal Board (“PTAB”), so long as the additional required fee does not 
dissuade you.4  
DENIED.  This couldn’t possibly be happening again!  Your 
interminable persistence cannot be extinguished by a board comprised of 
people who clearly do not understand the magnitude of your creation.  
Though it is possible that the patentability of your creation is a closer call 
than you initially thought, there is still another path to vindication, but this 
one diverges into two mutually exclusive options of judicial review: an 
appeal based on the record established by the USPTO and nothing more,5 or 
a civil action that allows for introduction of new evidence which may allow 
you to turn this close call into a success.6  While the latter choice does come 
at quite a higher cost,7 you have enough money to cover both your lawyer’s 
fees and the costs incurred by the USPTO in the process of the litigation.  
Understanding the greater financial burden that is required of you for what 
you feel is a more thorough review, you press on to the District Court for the 
Eastern District of Virginia.8 
DENIED.  Maybe at this point the interminable persistence has turned 
terminable, but knowing the risks associated with the more expensive path, 
you lick your wounds and prepare to pay the price.  Although the United 
States has long practiced the American Rule,9 and the statute said nothing 
about attorney’s fees, the court still requires you to pay the government’s 
attorney’s fees.  Maybe after multiple rounds of defeat, you can still afford 
to continue the legal battle to vindicate your grand invention or trademark, 
but just as likely, it has finally dawned on you that what you initially thought 
was a slam dunk patent or trademark application is not quite so.  You turn 
around and head home, with insult of attorney’s fees added to injury of your 
now slimmer wallet. 
 
 4  35 U.S.C. § 134(a) (“An applicant [who has been twice rejected may appeal to the 
PTAB after] having once paid the fee for such an appeal.”).  This fee varies depending on the 
entity appealing: $325 for a micro entity, $650 for a small entity, and $1300 for an entity not 
defined as a small or micro entity.  37 C.F.R. § 41.20(b)(3) (2017). 
 5  35 U.S.C. § 141 (allowing a patent applicant to appeal the decision of the PTAB under 
§ 134(a) to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit); id. § 144 (restricting 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit to the record before the PTAB.). 
 6  Id. § 145 (allowing a patent applicant to bring a civil action regarding the decision of 
the PTAB under § 134(a) to the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia); see Kappos 
v. Hyatt, 566 U.S. 431, 445–46 (2012) (“[T]here are no limitations on a patent applicant’s 
ability to introduce new evidence in a § 145 proceeding beyond those already present in the 
Federal Rules of Evidence and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”). 
 7  35 U.S.C. § 145 (“All the expenses of the proceeding shall be paid by the applicant.”). 
 8  Id. (“An applicant dissatisfied with the decision of the [PTAB] under section 134(a) 
may . . . have remedy . . . in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Virginia[.]”). 
 9  For discussion of the American Rule, see infra Part II.C. 
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But do you have to pay the attorney’s fees of the USPTO?  Currently, 
there is a circuit split regarding the proper interpretation of two statutes that 
ask the applicant to pay “all the expenses” or “all expenses” of a proceeding 
in a trademark or patent civil action.10  This Comment argues that the 
interpretation of the aforementioned language to include attorney’s fees runs 
afoul of the American Rule, defies both the language of the statute and the 
intent of Congress, and does more harm than it does good.  Part II of this 
Comment will briefly discuss the history of the Patent Act, the avenues of 
appeal that it establishes, the history and principles of the American Rule, 
and Supreme Court precedent regarding the rule.  Part III will discuss a 
circuit split that has recently developed regarding awarding attorney’s fees 
in the context of trademark and patent litigation.  Part IV will show that the 
proper and principled approach to resolving this circuit split is to adopt the 
holding in Nantkwest, Inc. v. Iancu,11 which concluded that attorney’s fees 
are not encompassed within the “all expenses” language.  Part V will briefly 
conclude and encourage the Supreme Court to adopt this holding. 
II. AMERICAN RULE AND APPEAL 
A. Brief History of the Patent Act 
The American patent system was created by the Patent Act of 179012 
with the intention of “promot[ing] the progress of useful arts . . . granting to 
[a patent owner] the sole and exclusive right and liberty of making, 
constructing, using and vending to others to be used, the said invention or 
discovery.”13  Initially, the power to approve and grant a patent was 
delegated to a three-party panel consisting of the Secretary of State, the 
Secretary of War, and the Attorney General.14  This trio operated under the 
 
 10  The statute in question in Shammas v. Focarino, 784 F.3d 219 (4th Cir. 2015), 15 
U.S.C. § 1071(b)(3), comes from the Lanham Act, which is concerned with trademark civil 
actions and uses the language “all the expenses.”  See 15 U.S.C. § 1071(b)(3) (2018).  The 
statute in question in Nantkwest, Inc. v. Iancu, 35 U.S.C. § 145, uses the language “all 
expenses.”  See 35 U.S.C. § 145; Nantkwest, Inc. v. Iancu, 898 F.3d 1177 (Fed. Cir. 2018) 
(en banc), cert. granted, 87 U.S.L.W. 3343 (U.S. Mar. 7, 2019).  This Comment discusses the 
Patent Act and its historical development at length primarily because the Lanham Act adopted 
the Patent Act’s structure for trademark appeals and civil actions, and has the support of 
congressional intent for the position that attorney’s fees were not to be included outside 
“exceptional cases.”  See infra notes 37, 125 and accompanying text.  For clarity, this note 
will use the phrase “all expenses” or “all the expenses of the proceeding” as a reference to the 
language used in both statutes. 
 11  Nantkwest, 898 F.3d at 1188. 
 12  Act of Apr. 10, 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109-12. 
 13  Id. 
 14  Id. 
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Department of State.15  In 1836, Congress established what is now known as 
the USPTO as an independent agency, still within the Department of State, 
and headed by a Commissioner of Patents.16  Below the Commissioner of 
Patents were patent examiners, who examined patent applications in place of 
the three-party panel, and whose decisions were appealable to an internal 
board.17  The agency was subsequently shifted to the Department of the 
Interior,18 then to the Department of Commerce, where it remains today.19  
The Patent Act of 1952 codified the sections which are the subject of the 
current circuit split, though the language used has been only slightly altered 
over the years.20 
B. Path to Judicial Review 
The Patent Act of 1952 provides a system to either apply for the 
protection a registered patent provides and appeal or bring a civil action after 
a patent application is denied.  An inventor or owner of a patent may file a 
patent application to the USPTO for approval by a USPTO examiner 
assigned to the application.  If the patent application is denied, the applicant 
has the right to request that the application be reexamined.21  If the patent 
application is denied twice, the applicant may appeal the decision of the 
USPTO examiner to the PTAB for reexamination.22  If after the Board’s 
deliberation, it affirms the rejection of the patent application, the applicant 
has two mutually exclusive options for judicial review: an appeal to the Court 
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, or a civil action in the Eastern District of 
Virginia.23  There are two notable differences between these options: the 
 
 15  See id.; P.J. Federico, Operation of the Patent Act of 1790, 18 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 237, 
237–38 (1936) (“The business of administering the act was organized in the Department of 
State.  The act provided that this Department keep the books and records, receive the papers 
filed, and perform other duties.”). 
 16  Act of July 4, 1836, ch.. 357, §§ 1, 2, 5, 7 Stat. 117. 
 17  Id. § 7. 
 18  Act of Mar. 3, 1849, ch. 108, 9 Stat. 395. 
 19  See 15 U.S.C. § 1511(4) (2018)(“The [USPTO] shall be under the jurisdiction and 
subject to the control of the Secretary of Commerce”); 35 U.S.C. §1(a) (“The [USPTO] is 
established as an agency of the United States, within the Department of Commerce.”). 
 20  Act of July 19, 1952, ch. 950, § 1, 66 Stat. 803; see generally 35 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq.  
While the Patent Act of 1952 codified 35 U.S.C. § 145, the language of the section that is 
being addressed had been in force for over 100 years at the time of being codified in chapter 
35, albeit with slight alteration.  See Act of March 3, 1839, ch. 88, § 10, 5 Stat. 353 (“[T]he 
whole of the expenses of the proceeding shall be paid by the applicant, whether the final 
decision shall be in his favor or otherwise.”). 
 21  35 U.S.C. § 132(a) (“[If after receiving notice of rejection, and] the applicant persists 
in [his or her] claim for a patent . . . the patent shall be reexamined.”). 
 22  Id. § 134. 
 23  See id. § 141(a) (Federal Circuit appeal); id. § 145 (Eastern District of Virginia civil 
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record available for review and the allocation of expenses.  In an appeal 
before the Federal Circuit, the court is restricted to reviewing only the record 
from which the PTAB rendered its decision.24  When proceeding in the 
Eastern District of Virginia, because the suit is de novo, the court is not 
restricted to the record from which the PTAB rendered its decision; the 
patent applicant has the opportunity to introduce evidence that was not 
initially considered in the patent application.25  In regard to the allocation of 
expenses, the statute that allows an appeal to the Federal Circuit makes no 
mention of any such allocation.26  In contrast, the statute that allows a civil 
action in the District Court of Virginia establishes that “[a]ll the expenses of 
the proceedings shall be paid by the applicant.”27 
The diverging paths of review first took root in the Patent Act of 1836, 
delineating between appeals based on denial of a patent, and appeals based 
on patent interference.28  Congress established these reviews as a response 
to the flood of lawsuits that had found their way into the legal system.29  To 
combat this, the Patent Act of 1836 established a Board of Examiners, 
appointed by the Secretary of State, to review decisions.  The Board was 
comprised of “three disinterested persons,” one of whom, if possible, was to 
be knowledgeable in the field of the patent in question.30  This enactment 
unfortunately did not solve Congress’s concerns for two reasons.  First, the 
appeals brought to the Board of Examiners took considerably longer and cost 
far more than expected, likely as a result of the Commissioner of Patents 
construing the Act to allow introduction of further evidence.31  Second, the 
compensation provided to those participating on the board of examiners was 
 
action). 
 24  See id. § 144 (“[T]he Federal Circuit shall review the decision from which an appeal 
is taken on the record before the Patent and Trademark Office.”) 
 25  See generally id. § 145; Kappos v. Hyatt, 566 U.S. 431, 445–46 (2012) (“[T]here are 
no limitations on a patent applicant’s ability to introduce new evidence in a § 145 proceeding 
beyond those already present in the Federal Rules of Evidence and Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.”); Folkins v. Watson, 129 F.Supp 362, 365 (D.D.C. 1954) (“The proceeding [is] a 
proceeding de novo and [is] not merely a review of the Patent Office proceedings.”), aff’d, 
223 F.2d 347 (D.C. Cir. 1955). 
 26  See 35 U.S.C. § 141. 
 27  Id. § 145. 
 28  Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 357 §§ 7–8, 5 Stat. 117, 119–21 (establishing an appeal to a 
board of examiners based on a denial of a patent by the Commissioner, and an appeal to a 
board of examiners based on patent interference). 
 29  S. DOC. NO. 26-338, at 3 (1836) (explaining that one of the “evils” that Congress 
intended to stop was “a great number of lawsuits aris[ing] . . . onerous to the courts . . . 
ruinous to the parties . . . and injurious to society”).  While this language shows that Congress 
did to some extent intend to make civil actions costlier, nothing in the record indicates that 
Congress intended to include attorney’s fees as a cost of civil actions. 
 30  Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 357 § 7, 5 Stat. 117, 119–20. 
 31  See P.J. Federico, The Patent Office in 1839, 21 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 786, 791 (1939). 
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so small that there was difficulty finding people who would agree to serve, 
again slowing down the process.32  To alleviate these issues, the 
Commissioner made recommendations that would later be adopted in the 
Patent Act of 1839.  These recommendations included having the Chief 
Justice of the District Court for the District of Columbia assess all of the 
appeals and bill of equity actions as well as expanding bill of equity actions 
so as to be granted in any case of patent refusal.33 
The changes instituted by the Patent Act of 1839 are still visible today, 
albeit with a slight change in language from “the whole of the expenses” to 
“all expenses.”34  This language was altered in 1870 while retaining the 
original meaning,35 and was subsequently codified in the Patent Act of 
1952.36  Over the course of its existence, the language of the statute has 
remained largely unaltered.  There is no clear indication of Congress’s 
intended meaning of the phrase “the whole of the expenses” or “all of the 
expenses” in regard to the Patent Act.  The Lanham Act, on the other hand, 
has legislative history to support the position that the use of “all the 
expenses” in 15 U.S.C. § 1071(b)(3) was not intended to include attorney’s 
fees.37 The Supreme Court has recognized that in cases where Congress 
intended to displace the American Rule through statutory construction, 
Congress uses “specific and explicit” language to signify its intention.38 
 
 32  Id. 
 33  Id. at 791–92; see Act of Mar. 3, 1839, ch. 88, §§ 10–11, 5 Stat. 353, 354–55.  Section 
ten of the Patent Act of 1839 extended section sixteen of the Patent Act of 1836 to “all cases 
where patents are refused for any reason whatever,” while both sections ten and eleven of the 
Patent Act of 1839 modified both appeals and bills of equity actions to be addressed by the 
Chief Justice of the District Court for the District of Columbia.  Id.  Section eleven of the 
Patent Act of 1839 also established that appeals would be reviewed “on the evidence produced 
before the Commissioner.”  Id. at 355.  This language was not included in section ten.  Id. at 
354–55.  This distinction is still reflected in the application of § 141 and § 145.  See supra 
notes 24–25 and accompanying text. 
 34  See Act of Mar. 3, 1839, ch. 88, § 10, 5 Stat. 353, 354. 
 35  An initially proposed version of this section required that “all costs shall be paid by 
the complainant, and whole amount of the costs taxed against the complainant shall not exceed 
the sum of twenty-five dollars.”  Cong. Globe, 41st Cong., 2nd Sess. 4820 (1870).  This 
language was ultimately struck and replaced with the language “all the expenses of the 
proceeding” that is present now.  Id.; see Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230 § 52, 16 Stat. 198, 205. 
 36  The language statute in the prior act was adopted again.  See Act of July 19, 1952, ch. 
950, § 145, 66 Stat. 792, 803 (“All the expenses of the proceedings shall be paid by the 
applicant.”). 
 37  See S. REP. NO. 93-1400, at 2 (1974).  Congress intended a grant of attorney’s fees to 
be “limit[ed] . . . to ‘exceptional cases,’” for “acts which courts have characterized as 
malicious, fraudulent, deliberate, and willful.”  Id. at 5.  This intent is visible in other sections 
of the Lanham Act, which explicitly reference “attorneys’ fees” as a damages reward for 
conduct that may be fairly characterized as “malicious, fraudulent, deliberate, and willful.”  
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(2)(D)(iv), 1116(d)(11), 1117(a), 1117(b).   
 38  For discussion of Supreme Court precedent regarding fee-shifting statutes that 
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C. American Rule 
The American Rule is the “bedrock principle” when considering 
whether to award attorney’s fees: “each litigant pays [his or her] own 
attorney’s fees, win or lose, unless a statute or contract provides 
otherwise.”39  The American judiciary first articulated this principle in the 
1796 case of Arcambel v. Wiseman.40  In a succinct, six-sentence opinion, 
the Supreme Court rejected the circuit court’s award of $1600 in counsels’ 
fees as damages.41 The per curiam opinion explained that “[t]he general 
practice of the United States is in oposition [sic] to it; and even if that practice 
were not strictly correct in principle, it is entitled to the respect of the court, 
till it is changed, or modified, by statute.”42 
This opinion was handed down at a time when numerous states had 
already enacted statutes allowing for the award of attorney’s fees, adopting 
the English Rule of the time.43  The English Rule allowed “costs” recoverable 
in an action to include attorney’s fees, creating a “loser pays” system.44  
These statutes coincided with considerable hostility towards lawyers, with 
some attempts to ban lawyers from practicing within a state.45  State 
legislatures that had initially created schedules similar to those created in 
England, which established the outer bounds of collectable attorney’s fees, 
failed to keep the schedules up-to-date; in effect, the situation devolved into 
recoverable costs becoming nominal or nonexistent.46  Despite this, the 
 
displace the American Rule, see infra Part II.D.  For further examples of language that the 
courts have acknowledged as being sufficiently “specific and explicit,” see infra notes 161–
162 and accompanying text. 
 39  See Hardt v. Reliance Std. Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242, 252–53 (2010). 
 40  3 U.S. 306, 306 (1796). 
 41  Id. 
 42  Id. 
 43  See A.-H Chroust, THE RISE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN AMERICA 85-327 (1965); 
Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The English Versus the American Rule on Attorney 
Fees: An Empirical Study of Public Company Contracts, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 327, 329 
(2013). 
 44  See generally Statute of Gloucester 1278, 6 Edw., c. 1. (directing defendants to pay 
costs to successful plaintiffs); see William B. Stoebuck, Counsel Fees Included in Costs: A 
Logical Development, 38 U. COLO. L. REV. 202, 204 (1965).  Stoebuck noted that the recovery 
of costs dates back as far as the 13th century. Statutes were introduced to regulate costs 
recoverable, which created exceptions in certain actions, and court-created schedules were 
introduced to establish outer limits to the amount recoverable.  These schedules and the 
exercise of judicial discretion were the system in which attorney’s fees were awarded in the 
past and the present.  Id. at 204–05. 
 45  See John Leubsdorf, Toward a History of the American Rule on Attorney Fee 
Recovering Attorney Fee Recovery, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9, 11 (1984). 
 46  See id. at 10 (noting that the New York Legislature fixed the amount recoverable in 
dollar amounts instead of a percentage of amount recovered); Stoebuck, supra note 44, at 204, 
207; Charles T. McCormick, Counsel Fees and Other Expenses of Litigation as an Element 
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Arcambel opinion was met with staunch opposition, with states creating 
numerous exceptions and extensions to circumvent the Supreme Court’s 
holding.47 
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court built upon the American Rule, 
expanding on the outer limits of the restraint on attorney’s fees awards. It 
has allowed the recovery of attorney’s fees in the context of securing trust 
funds,48 preserving a common fund,49 and securing a common benefit.50  
Additionally, the Supreme Court has recognized that misconduct may allow 
for a shift of attorney’s fees,51 as well as the losing party’s bad faith.52 
The adoption of the American Rule is rooted in public policy.  Chief 
Justice Warren explained that the argument has been made that “[s]ince 
litigation is at best uncertain one should not be penalized for merely 
defending or prosecuting a lawsuit, and . . . the poor might be unjustly 
discouraged from instituting actions to vindicate their rights if the penalty 
for losing included the fees of their opponent’s counsel.”53  Chief Justice 
Warren went on to explain that “the time, expense, and difficulties of proof 
inherent in litigating the question of what constitutes reasonable attorney’s 
fees would pose substantial burdens for judicial administration.”54  This 
opinion underscores the main concerns rooted in the American Rule: access 
to the court system, predictability in litigation cost, and the burden on judicial 
administration.  The American Rule allows plaintiffs who have meritorious 
 
of Damages, 15 MINN. L. REV. 619, 620 n.7 (1931) (noting that a statute that awarded 
attorneys fifteen shilling in 1745 was unchanged for seventy-five years). 
 47  See Stephen R. Ginger, Attorneys’ Fees Awards to Contract Nonsignatories: Should 
Equitable Estoppel Inform the Discretion of the Courts?, 40 GOLDEN STATE U. L. REV. 15, 20 
(2009) (noting the reception of the Arcambel decision and the numerous exceptions created 
by courts and legislatures alike). 
 48  See Cowdrey v. Galveston, H. & H. R. Co., 93 U.S. 352, 352, 355 (1877) (allowing 
recovery from a trust fund for a party who incurs attorney’s fees preserving or recovering a 
fund of another). 
 49  See Trs. v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527, 537 (1882) (allowing recovery of attorney’s fees 
for a party who incurs legal fees protecting or collecting the fund). 
 50  See Sprague v. Ticonic Nat’l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 166–67 (1939) (allowing recovery 
of attorney’s fees by a successful litigant where the litigation provides a substantial benefit on 
a class of persons). 
 51  See Toledo Scale Co. v. Computing Scale Co., 261 U.S. 399, 427–28 (1923) (allowing 
recovery of attorney’s fees against a party who has been found in contempt of court, causing 
further litigation expense to correct the contempt). 
 52  See Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 2, 5 (1973) (allowing recovery of attorney’s fees against 
a losing party who act in “bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.” 
(citation omitted)). For further discussion of the exceptions recognized by the courts to the 
American Rule, see John F. Vargo, The American Rule on Attorney Fee Allocation: The 
Injured Person’s Access to Justice, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1567, 1578–90 (1993). 
 53  Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1976). 
 54  Id. 
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claims to litigate them in the judicial system by foreclosing the possibility of 
being saddled with their adversary’s often considerable attorney’s fees.55  
The American Rule also avoids the added expense of having to litigate the 
award of attorney’s fees.  The determination of reasonable attorney’s fees 
has evolved with time, from a percentage-based calculation to a factor-based 
test, and the calculation is not always as clean as parties would hope.56 
D. Statutory Construction and Supreme Court Precedent 
Congress has the ability to displace the American Rule with proper 
statutory language.  The Supreme Court has recognized two forms of 
language that displace the American Rule and has developed two lines of 
precedent regarding each one, with the two requiring different types of 
clarity and use of language.  The first is the “prevailing party” precedent, 
best displayed in Commissioner, I.N.S. v. Jean57 and Baker Botts v. 
ASARCO.58  The second is the “non-prevailing party” precedent, best 
displayed by Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Insurance Company59 and 
Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club.60 
1. “Prevailing Party” Precedent 
The Court in Baker Botts explained that the best example of “prevailing 
party” requirement can be found in the Court’s prior interpretation of the 
Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”) in Commissioner, I.N.S. v. Jean.61  In 
Jean, the Court addressed whether 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A)62 allowed for 
deviation from the American Rule.63  This EAJA statute uses the terms 
“prevailing party,” “fees,” and “civil action” to establish its intent to displace 
the American Rule.64  The Court in Jean held that this language sufficiently 
 
 55  See Walter Olsen & David Bernstein, Loser-Pays: Where Next?, 55 MD. L. REV. 1161, 
1188 (noting that concerns over paying large legal fees upon losing a case hurts the middle 
class both when they sue and when they get sued). 
 56  See generally Michael Kao, Calculating Lawyers’ Fees: Theory and Reality, 51 
UCLA L. Rev. 825, 829–33 (2004). 
 57  496 U.S. 154 (1990). 
 58  135 S. Ct. 2158 (2015). 
 59  560 U.S. 242 (2010). 
 60  463 U.S. 680 (1983). 
 61  Baker Botts, 135 S.Ct. at 2164. 
 62  28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (2018) (“[A] court shall award to a prevailing party other 
than the United States fees and other expenses, in addition to any costs awarded pursuant to 
subsection (a), . . . .”). 
 63  Jean, 496 U.S. at 156–57 (1990) (addressing recovery of attorney’s fees in response 
to litigation about fees). 
 64  It was the intent of Congress to “insure the applicability . . . of the common law and 
statutory exceptions to the ‘American Rule’ respecting attorney fees.”  Id. at 163 n.11. 
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allows for the awarding of fees from “all aspects of the civil action,” which 
includes attorney’s fees.65  The Court subsequently in Baker Botts explained 
that what it required was a statute that includes the terms “fees,” a “prevailing 
party,” and “civil action” to displace the American Rule.66  Utilizing this 
framework again, the Court in Baker Botts rejected the claim that 11 U.S.C. 
§ 330(a)(1) allowed for an award of attorney’s fees.67  The language 
“reasonable compensation for actual, necessary services rendered” used in 
the statute “neither specifically nor explicitly authorizes courts to shift the 
costs” of attorney’s fees in contravention of the American Rule.68  The Court 
makes clear that for a “prevailing party” statute to displace the American 
Rule, it must include language such as “fees,” “prevailing party,” 
“successful,” and “civil action.”69  An example of such language can be 
found in 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1), a provision of the Administrative Procedure 
Act, which requires that “[a]n agency that conducts an adversary 
adjudication shall award, to a prevailing party other than the United States, 
fees and other expenses incurred by that party in connection with that 
proceeding.”70  This language comports with the “prevailing party” 
precedent requirements, and allows for the shifting of attorney’s fees. 
2. “Non-Prevailing Party” Precedent 
In “non-prevailing party” precedent, the Court again looks for “specific 
and explicit” language, but in a different form.  In Hardt, the Court addressed 
whether 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1) allowed the award of attorneys’ fees only to 
the prevailing party.71  While the statute does not provide a “prevailing party” 
requirement, the Court acknowledged that there are “deviations from the 
American Rule that do not limit attorney’s fees awards to the ‘prevailing 
party.’”72  The Hardt Court cited Ruckelshaus as the principal case regarding 
“non-prevailing party” precedent.73  The Ruckelshaus Court addressed 
whether it was appropriate for the lower courts to award attorney’s fees 
 
 65  Id. at 161. 
 66  Baker Botts, 135 S. Ct. at 2164. 
 67  Id. at 2165; see 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1)(A) (2018) (allowing “reasonable compen-sation 
for actual, necessary services rendered” by [those assisting in the representation of an estate, 
including] attorney[s]”). 
 68  Baker Botts, 135 S. Ct. at 2165. 
 69  Id. at 2164; see Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 684 (1983) (noting 
“successful” as a phrase often found in prevailing party fee-shifting statutes). 
 70  See 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1) (2018) (emphasis added). 
 71  Hardt v. Reliance Std. Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242, 251–52 (2010); see 29 U.S.C. § 
1132(g)(1) (2018) (“[T]he court in its discretion may allow a reasonable attorney’s fee and 
costs of action to either party.”). 
 72  Hardt, 560 U.S. at 254. 
 73  Id. 
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pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 7607(f),74 despite the lack of a success requirement.75  
The Court held that while the statute in question did not have a “prevailing 
party” requirement, it was still sufficient to allow an award of attorney’s 
fees.76  While the Court does not require any particular magic words to shift 
fees, there still needs to be some language that is “specific and explicit” that 
the Court may point to as evidence that it was truly Congress’s intention to 
shift fees from one party to another.77  An example of such a situation can be 
found in 2 U.S.C. § 396, a statute dealing with contested elections in 
Congress, which allows for “reimbursement . . . of his reasonable expenses 
of the contested election case, including reasonable attorneys’ fees.”78 
III. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
While the American Rule is the default approach to awarding attorney’s 
fees, it can be displaced by statute.79  The language that is required to displace 
the American Rule through statute usually “contain[s] language that 
authorizes the award of ‘a reasonable attorney’s fee,’ ‘fees,’ or ‘litigation 
costs.’”80  The circuit split detailed below attempts to address whether the 
statutory language in question meets the “specific and explicit” requirement 
for displacement of the American Rule. 
In 2015, the Fourth Circuit in Shammas v. Focarino81 was tasked with 
interpreting 15 U.S.C. § 1071(b)(3) to determine whether the statute allowed 
for the recovery of attorney’s fees in a trademark application civil action 
based on the language “all expenses of the proceeding shall be paid by the 
 
 74  42 U.S.C. § 7607(f) (2018) (“In any judicial proceeding under this section, the court 
may award costs of litigation (including reasonable attorney and expert witness fees) 
whenever it determines that such award is appropriate.”).   
 75  Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 682 (1983). 
 76  Id. at 682 (allowing an award of attorney’s fees despite § 7607(f) not articulating a 
prevailing party requirement). 
 77  See Summit Valley Indus. v. Local 112, United Bhd. of Carpenters, 456 U.S. 717, 
721–22 (1982); see also Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809, 815 (1994) (“The 
absence of [a] specific reference to attorney’s fees is not dispositive if the statute otherwise 
evinces an intent to provide for such fees.”).  For further discussion of Key Tronic and its 
consideration of Congressional intent by examining the full statutory construction, see infra 
notes 180–186. 
 78  See 2 U.S.C. § 396 (2018) (emphasis added). 
 79  See Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. 306, 306 (1796); Baker Botts, L.L.P. v. ASARCO, 
LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2158, 2164 (2015) (“Because [the American Rule] is deeply rooted in the 
common law, this Court will not deviate from it ‘absent explicit statutory language.’” 
(citations omitted)); see generally John F. Vargo, supra note 52, at 1568–88 (noting there are 
more than two hundred federal statutes and almost 2,000 state statutes providing attorney 
fees). 
 80  See generally Hardt v. Reliance Std. Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242, 253 (2010). 
 81  784 F.3d 221 (4th Cir. 2015). 
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party bringing the case.”82  After analyzing the language and structure of the 
statute, the court held that it indeed allowed for the recovery of attorney’s 
fees.83 
Five years later, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in 
Nantkwest, Inc. v. Iancu was similarly tasked with interpreting a near-
identical phrase in 35 U.S.C. § 145 concerning the recovery of attorney’s 
fees in a patent application civil action.84  After criticism of the Shammas 
court’s analysis of § 1071(b)(3),85 the Nantkwest court held that the language 
and structure of the statute did not allow for recovery of attorney’s fees.86  
Because of the near-identical language of the statutes in question, there is 
now a circuit split as to whether attorney’s fees can be recovered in de novo 
trademark and patent application civil actions.87 
A. Shammas v. Focarino 
1. Facts of the Case 
Plaintiff Milo Shammas was the owner of a gardening supply company, 
Dr. Earth, Inc.88  Shammas filed a trademark application for the mark 
“PROBIOTIC” which was to be used in conjunction with Dr. Earth fertilizer 
products.89  The USPTO attorney assigned to Shammas’s application denied 
it on two grounds: the word “probiotic” was a generic term for particular 
types of soil additives and fertilizers, and even if the term “probiotic” was 
descriptive of the product, it did not have a secondary meaning.90  Shammas 
appealed this decision by the USPTO attorney to the Trademark Trial and 
Appeal Board (“TTAB”), who affirmed the decision of the USPTO 
attorney.91  The Lanham Act provides two options for review: an appeal to 
the Federal Circuit, or a de novo civil action in the district court.92  Shammas 
 
 82  Id. at 222. 
 83  Id. at 227. 
 84  Nantkwest, Inc. v. Iancu, 898 F.3d 1177, 1180 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (en banc), cert. 
granted, 87 U.S.L.W. 3343 (U.S. Mar. 7, 2019 (No. 18-801). 
 85  Id. at 1185 (“We respectfully submit that Shammas’s holding cannot be squared with 
the Supreme Court’s line of non-prevailing party precedent applying the American Rule.”). 
 86  Id. at 1196. 
 87  Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1071(b)(3) (2018) (“[A]ll the expenses of the proceeding shall 
be paid by the party bringing the case[.]”), with 35 U.S.C. § 145 (2018) (“All the expenses of 
the proceedings shall be paid by the applicant.”). 
 88  Shammas, 784 F.3d at 221. 
 89  Id. 
 90  Brief for Appellee at 3–4, Shammas v. Focarino, 784 F.3d 219 (4th Cir. 2015) (No. 
14-1191), 2016 WL 7406019, at *4. 
 91  Shammas, 784 F.3d at 221. 
 92  Id.; 15 U.S.C. § 1071(a)(1) (“An applicant for registration of a mark . . . who is 
dissatisfied with the decision of the Director or [TTAB], may appeal to the United States 
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filed for review in the district court, and the district court granted the 
USPTO’s summary judgment motion on the grounds that Shammas “had 
failed to cast doubt on the finding that ‘PROBIOTIC’ was a generic term.”93  
The USPTO then filed a motion to be reimbursed for the expenses incurred 
as a result of the proceeding, pursuant to § 1071(b)(3).94  These expenses 
totaled $35,926.59, which included the combined expenses of two USPTO 
attorneys’ prorated salaries, and one paralegal.95  Shammas opposed the 
awarding of the attorneys’ and paralegal’s prorated salaries, arguing that § 
1071(b)(3) did not explicitly provide for the recovery of attorney’s fees that 
is required to displace the American Rule.96  The district court affirmed the 
reimbursement of the prorated salaries of the two attorneys and the paralegal, 
stating, “the plain meaning of the term ‘expenses,’ by itself, would clearly 
seem to include attorney’s fees.  But if any doubt remained, it is removed by 
Congress’s addition of the word ‘all’ to clarify the breadth of the term 
‘expenses.’”97  By adding this modifier, Congress made clear that it intended 
that the plaintiff in such an action pay for all the resources expended by the 
USPTO during litigation, including attorney’s fees.”98  Shammas appealed 
the court order requiring that he pay the prorated attorneys’ and paralegal’s 
fees.99 
2. The Shammas Court’s Analysis 
The Fourth Circuit began by addressing Shammas’s concern that 
because Congress did not expressly authorize attorney-fee-shifting in § 
1071(b)(3), “a district court may not read a federal statute to authorize” such 
 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit . . . .”); id. § 1071(b)(1) (“Whenever a person 
authorized by subsection (a) of this section to appeal to the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit and is dissatisfied with the decision of the Director or [TTAB], said 
person may, [unless a 1071(a)(1) appeal has commenced], have a remedy by a civil 
action . . . .”).  The structure of the appeal and civil action process in the Lanham Act is the 
same as the process in the Patent Act of 1952.  See 35 U.S.C. § 141; id. § 145. 
 93  Shammas, 784 F.3d at 221. 
 94  Id. at 221–222; 15 U.S.C. § 1071 (b)(3) (“[U]nless the court finds the expenses to be 
unreasonable, all the expenses of the proceeding shall be paid by the party bringing the case, 
whether the final decision is in favor of such party or not.” (emphasis added)). 
 95  Shammas, 784 F.3d at 222.  Of the $36,320.49 awarded, $32,836.27 was awarded for 
the prorated salaries of the attorneys, and $3,090.32 was awarded for the salary of the 
paralegal.  This was calculated by dividing the employees’ annual salaries by 2000 and 
multiplying by the total hours expended defending the action.  The USPTO also included 
$393.90 in photocopying expenses.  Id. 
 96  Id. 
 97  Shammas v. Focarino, 990 F.Supp.2d 587, 591 (E.D. Va. 2014). 
 98  Id. 
 99  Shammas, 784 F.3d at 222. 
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fee-shifting and displace the American Rule.100  The Fourth Circuit seized 
on Shammas’s acknowledgement that the term “expenses” is broad enough 
to encompass attorneys’ and paralegals’ fees.101  Additionally, the Fourth 
Circuit drew attention to the modifier “all” that precedes “expenses” within 
the statute to show that, even within a common meaning of “expenses,” 
Congress did not intend for it to be limited.102  Further, citing Wisconsin v. 
Hotline Indus., Inc.,103 the Fourth Circuit established that although the 
USPTO attorneys are in salaried positions, their being diverted from other 
work within the USPTO is an expense that is incurred by the USPTO.104 
Having dealt with the issue of what the phrase “all expenses” includes, 
what is left of Shammas’s argument is whether § 1071(b)(3) sufficiently and 
explicitly shifts attorney’s fees in a way that overcomes the American Rule’s 
presumption that attorney’s fees are not included.105  The Fourth Circuit 
began its analysis of Shammas’s argument by stating that his assumption that 
the American Rule applied was “misplaced under the circumstances.”106  
Close inspection of the American Rule, the court explained, shows that its 
intention is to prevent the prevailing party from recovering attorney’s fees 
from the losing party.107  This purpose ties into the “express authorization” 
that Shammas argued is required of Congress to create a fee-shifting statute.  
The Fourth Circuit drew attention to the Supreme Court’s opinion in 
Ruckelshaus explaining that when Congress has decided to depart from the 
American Rule, “virtually every one of the more than 150 existing federal 
fee-shifting provisions predicates fee awards on some success by the 
claimant . . . the consistent rule is that complete failure will not justify 
shifting fees.”108  Based on this language, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that 
the “specific and explicit” language required to overcome the American Rule 
is only required when it is meant to prevent the prevailing party from 
 
 100  Id. 
 101  Id. 
 102  Id.; see 15 U.S.C. 1071(a)(1). 
 103  236 F.3d 363 (7th Cir. 2000) 
 104  Shammas, 784 F.3d at 223; see Hotline Indus., Inc., 236 F.3d at 365 (“[S]alaried 
government lawyers . . . do incur expenses if the time and resources they devote to one case 
are not available for other work.”). 
 105  Shammas, 784 F.3d at 223. 
 106  Id. 
 107  Id. (citing Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 245 (1975) 
(“[T]he prevailing party may not recover attorneys’ fees as costs or otherwise.”) (emphasis 
added); see also, Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human 
Res., 532 U.S. 598, 602 (2001) (“[T]he prevailing party is not entitled to collect [attorney’s 
fees] from the loser.”). 
 108  Shammas, 784 F.3d at 223 (emphasis in original); for discussion of Ruckelshaus, see 
supra notes 74–76 and accompanying text. 
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recovering attorney’s fees; because § 1071(b)(3) has no prevailing party 
requirement, the American Rule is not implicated, and no specific and 
explicit language is required.109 
 In contrast, § 1071(b)(3) requires that “all the expenses of the 
proceeding shall be paid by the party bringing the case, whether the final 
decision is in the favor of such party or not.”110  With that, the Fourth Circuit 
found that § 1071(b)(3) is not a statute that stands within the context of the 
American Rule, and does not require the “express authorization” that 
Shammas argued is required to establish fee-shifting.111  Analyzing the plain 
language of § 1071(b)(3), the Fourth Circuit held that in a de novo district 
court proceeding, the expenses include attorney’s fees, regardless of 
success.112 
The Fourth Circuit then turned to an alternative argument advanced by 
Shammas: that “expenses of the proceeding” within the context of the statute 
should be interpreted as aligning with the meaning of “costs of the 
proceeding,” which only includes taxable costs.113  In adopting the “costs of 
the proceeding” interpretation, taxable costs would not include attorney’s 
fees.114  The Fourth Circuit quickly disposed of this argument based on 
Shammas’s failure to offer an explanation as to why the court should adopt 
this view, and based on the court’s previous rulings.115  Additionally, the 
Fourth Circuit explained that, in applying the “cardinal principle of statutory 
construction,” Congress did not intend for “expenses” to be interchangeable 
with “costs” within  § 1071(b)(3).116 
The Fourth Circuit continues by analyzing both the statutory scheme 
and the legislative history of the Lanham Act.117  First, the Fourth Circuit 
explains that because an action under 
§ 1071(b)(1) is a de novo civil action, it is a more extensive and 
expensive action for the USPTO than an appeal under § 1071(a)(1).118  By 
requiring the trademark applicant to pay “all the expenses of the proceeding,” 
 
 109  Shammas, 784 F.3d at 223. 
 110  Id.; see 15 U.S.C. 1071(b)(3) (emphasis added). 
 111  See Shammas, 784 F.3d at 223–24. 
 112  Id. at 224. 
 113  Id. 
 114  Id. 
 115  Id.; see Robertson v. Cooper, 46 F.2d 766, 769 (4th Cir. 1931) (allowing recovery of 
a government attorney’s expenses related to attending depositions). 
 116  See Shammas, 784 F.3d at 224; TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001) (“[A] 
statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that . . . no clause, sentence, or word shall 
be superfluous.”) (citation omitted). 
 117  Shammas, 784 F.3d at 225. 
 118  Id. 
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regardless of success, Congress intended to alleviate the burden on the 
USPTO having to defend its findings.119  Additionally, in examining the 
breakdown of the USPTO’s expenses incurred in the proceeding, 98% are 
attributable to attorneys’ and paralegals’ fees.120  To not allow for the 
recovery of 98% of the expenses incurred would be anomalous, especially 
considering the availability of an alternative avenue of appeal under § 
1071(a)(1).121  Second, in examining the legislative history of the Lanham 
Act, the Fourth Circuit explained that § 1071(b)(3) was “intended as a 
straightforward funding provision, designed to relieve the USPTO of the 
financial burden that results from an applicant’s election to pursue more 
expensive district court litigation.”122  The language of § 1071(b)(3) was 
adopted from a parallel provision of the Patent Act, which established “a 
fund for the payment of the salaries of the officers and clerks . . . and all other 
expenses of the [USPTO].”123  The Patent Act additionally differentiated 
between the terms “expense” and “cost.”124  The Lanham Act’s passage 
“[incorporated] the procedures for appellate review of patent application 
denials in trademark proceedings.”125  With this, the Fourth Circuit 
concluded that when a trademark application denial is appealed under § 
1071(b)(1), “all of the expenses” under § 1071(b)(3) include the prorated 
salaries of the USPTO attorneys and paralegals who worked on the defense 
of the decision.126 
B. Nantkwest, Inc. v. Iancu 
1. Facts of the Case 
In 2001, Dr. Hans Klingemann filed a patent application for a cancer 
treatment that utilized natural cells to kill cancer cells.127  Dr. Klingemann’s 
patent application was assigned to Nantkwest, and the application was 
 
 119  Id. 
 120  Id. 
 121  Id. 
 122  Id. at 226. 
 123  Shammas, 784 F.3d at 226 (citing Act of July, 1836, ch. 357, § 9, 5 Stat. 117, 121). 
 124  Compare Act of July, 1836, ch. 357, § 9, 5 Stat. 117, 121 (“[A]nd all other expenses 
of the [USPTO]”) (emphasis added), with id. § 15, 5 Stat. at 123 (“[T]o adjudge and award as 
to costs, as may appear just and equitable.”) (emphasis added). 
 125  Shammas, 784 F.3d at 226 (citing S. REP. NO. 87-2107, at 7 (1962)). The Lanham Act 
initially cross-referenced the procedures for review in the Patent Act, but was later amended 
to remove the cross-reference and “incorporate, with necessary changes in language, the 
various provisions of [35 U.S.C. § 1 et. seq.] relating to such appeals and review.”  S. REP. 
NO. 87-2107, at 7 (1962).   
 126  Id. at 227. 
 127  Nantkwest, Inc. v. Iancu, 898 F.3d 1177, 1183 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (en banc), cert. 
granted, 87 U.S.L.W. 3343 (U.S. Mar. 7, 2019) (No. 18-801). 
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rejected in 2010 for being “obvious.”128  The PTO Board affirmed the 
rejection of Nantkwest’s patent in 2013, resulting in Nantkwest’s civil action 
under § 145.129  At the close of discovery, the USPTO moved for, and was 
granted, summary judgment.130  The USPTO then filed a motion for 
reimbursement in accordance with § 145, which totaled $111,696.39, and 
included $78,592.50 in attorneys’ fees.131  The court denied the motion, 
citing the American Rule. The district court explained its reasoning as being 
grounded in the Baker Botts standard, which § 145 does not overcome in a 
manner sufficient to fee-shift within the American Rule.132  The USPTO 
appealed the denial of the motion, and a Federal Circuit panel reversed.133 
The panel relied heavily on the Shammas opinion.134  The Federal Circuit 
voted sua sponte to hear the appeal en banc, focusing on the question of 
whether the language “all the expenses of the proceedings” allows for an 
award of attorney’s fees.135 
2. The Nantkwest Court’s Analysis 
As an initial matter, the Federal Circuit held that the American Rule 
applies to § 145,136 explaining that the American Rule is the “starting point” 
for any party or statute that attempts to shift the cost of attorney’s fees to the 
other party.137  The USPTO relied on the Shammas opinion for the position 
that that the American Rule should not apply to § 145, which the Federal 
Circuit found unpersuasive.138  The Federal Circuit was skeptical of the 
Fourth Circuit’s view that the American Rule does not apply, relying on 
Alyeska Pipeline Service Company v. Wilderness Society,139 which states that 
“the American Rule provides only that ‘the prevailing party may not recover 
attorneys’ fees from the losing party.’”140  The Federal Circuit drew attention 
 
 128  Id. 
 129  Id. 
 130  Id.; see Nantkwest v. Lee, 686 F. App’x 864, 856 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (affirming). 
 131  Nantkwest, 898 F.3d at 1183.  Attorney’s fees were calculated in a similar fashion to 
the calculation in Shammas—prorated salaries of two USPTO attorneys’ and one paralegal. 
 132  Id.; see Baker Botts, L.L.P v. ASARCO, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2158, 2164 (2010) (with 
some variation, a majority of statutes that authorize fee-shifting within the American Rule 
include language such as “a reasonable attorney’s fee,” “fees,” or “litigation costs”). 
 133  Nantkwest, 898 F.3d at 1183. 
 134  Id.  For discussion of the Shammas opinion, see supra Part III.A. 
 135  Nantkwest, 898 F.3d at 1184; see Nantkwest v. Matal, 869 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2017) 
(vacating panel ruling and reinstating appeal sua sponte). 
 136  Nantkwest, 898 F.3d at 1184. 
 137  Id.; see Baker Botts, 135 S. Ct. at 2164 (“Our basic point of reference when considering 
the award of attorney’s fees is . . . the American Rule.”). 
 138  Nantkwest, 898 F.3d at 1184. 
 139  421 U.S. 240 (1975). 
 140  Shammas v. Focarino, 784 F.3d 219, 223 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Alyeska Pipeline, 
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to the fact that Alyeska Pipeline’s rule is not strictly predicated on the 
language of the “prevailing party.”141  The Federal Circuit found that the 
Hardt Court’s definition of the American Rule was more relevant to the 
question of whether the American Rule was applicable to § 145.142  In Hardt, 
the Federal Circuit analyzed whether the language of 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1) 
allowed the award of attorney’s fees only to the prevailing party.143  The 
Court found that the absence of reference to a prevailing party within the text 
did not displace the American Rule from a fee-shifting inquiry, and instead 
held that “statutory deviations from the American Rule [do not] limit 
attorney’s fees awards to the ‘prevailing party.’”144 
The Federal Circuit next turned to the Fourth Circuit’s application of 
Ruckelshaus.145  Although the Ruckelshaus Court recognized that a number 
of fee-shifting provisions include some “success” requirement, the court also 
recognized that a lack of a “success” requirement does not mean that the 
American Rule is inapplicable.  Instead, the court held that despite the fact 
that the statue in question did not have such a requirement, the American 
Rule still applied.146  Additionally, the Nantkwest court noted that the 
Supreme Court has applied the American Rule to statutes that do not specify 
a “success” requirement on multiple occasions.147  In an attempt to bolster 
its position, the USPTO cited Sebelius v. Cloer,148 which interpreted a statute 
requiring the payment of attorney’s fees whether or not the party succeeded 
without discussing the American Rule.149  The Federal Circuit quickly 
distinguished this case, and explained that Cloer “[stood] for the 
unremarkable principle that a statute providing for an award of attorney’s 
fees can displace the American Rule.”150 
 
421 U.S. at 245) (emphasis in original). 
 141  Nantkwest, 898 F.3d at 1185. 
 142  See id. 
 143  Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242, 251–52 (2010); see 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1132(g)(1) (2018) (“[T]he court in its discretion may allow a reasonable attorney’s fee and 
costs of action to either party.”). 
 144  Hardt, 560 U.S. at 254. 
 145  For the Shammas court’s application of Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680 
(1983), see supra notes 108–109 and accompanying text. 
 146  Nantkwest, 898 F.3d at 1185; see Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S. at 682–84. 
 147  Nantkwest, 898 F.3d at 1185–86 (citing Baker Botts, L.L.P v. ASARCO, LLC, 135 S. 
Ct. 2158, 2165 (2015) (bankruptcy statute); Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809, 
819 (1994) (environmental statute); Summit Valley Indus. v. Local 112, United Bhd. of 
Carpenters, 456 U.S. 717, 722 (1982) (unfair labor practice statute)). 
 148  569 U.S. 369 (2013). 
 149  See id. at 379 (explaining that the Court’s examination in a statutory construction case 
ends when the “statutory language is unambiguous and the statutory scheme is coherent and 
consistent”).   
 150  Nantkwest, 898 F.3d at 1186; see 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(e) (2018) (“In awarding 
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After resolving the question of whether the American Rule applied to § 
145 in the affirmative, the Federal Circuit next addressed whether the 
language of § 145 overrides the American Rule.151  It is first noted that the 
Supreme Court has explained that when a statutory provision does not 
“expressly provide for the recovery of attorney’s fees,” Congress has not 
created a situation where awarding such attorney’s fees is permissible.152  
This does not foreclose the possibility that Congress’s intent can be read into 
the statute from a lack of express language, as Congress can convey such 
intent through choices in statutory language.153  These statutory language 
choices must, nonetheless, convey a “specific and explicit” instruction to 
displace the American Rule.154  Next, the Federal Circuit noted that § 145 
does not evince the “specific and explicit” authorization by Congress to 
depart from the American Rule.155  The language in § 145 is “at best 
ambiguous,” and the court declined to read intent into language that does not 
convey some sort of explicit direction regarding fee-shifting.156  The Federal 
Circuit countered the USPTO’s dictionary definition of “expense”157  with 
the definition of “expense” from other dictionaries in the same time period158 
to show that it is ineffective to rely on vague and varied definitions to attempt 
to establish an “implicit authorization to award attorney’s fees.”159 
Rather than relying on dictionary definitions, the Federal Circuit 
 
compensation on a petition filed [under this section] the special master or court shall also 
award as part of such compensation an amount to cover reasonable attorneys’ fees[.]”) 
(emphasis added). 
 151  Nantkwest, 898 F.3d at 1186. 
 152  See Summit Valley, 456 U.S. at 722 (internal citations omitted); Key Tronic, 511 U.S. 
at 815. 
 153  See Summit Valley, 456 U.S. at 722–23; see also Key Tronic, 511 U.S. at 815 (“The 
absence of [a] specific reference to attorney’s fees is not dispositive if the statute otherwise 
evinces an intent to provide for such fees.”). 
 154  Baker Botts, L.L.P. v. ASARCO, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2158, 2161 (2015).  See also Summit 
Valley, 456 U.S. at 726 (applying the American Rule after finding no “express statutory 
authorization” in the statute’s language to support the position that “damages” includes 
attorney’s fees); Key Tronic, 511 U.S. at 819 (requiring “explicit statutory authority” to depart 
from the American Rule). 
 155  Nantkwest, 898 F.3d at 1187. 
 156  Id. 
 157  Expense, AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1st ed. 1828) (“[A] 
laying out or expending; the disbursing of money, or the employment and consumption, as of 
time or labor.”) 
 158  Expense, A COMPREHENSIVE PRONOUNCING AND EXPLANATORY DICTIONARY OF THE 
ENGLISH LANGUAGE, WITH PRONOUNCING VOCABULARIES OF CLASSICAL AND SCRIPTURE 
PROPER NAMES (1830) (“[C]ost; charges; money expended.”); Expense, AN AMERICAN 
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (Joseph Worcester ed., 1830) (“Money expended,” 
“cost,” and “[t]hat which is used, employed, laid out or consumed.”). 
 159  Nantkwest, 898 F.3d at 1187 (quoting Summit Valley, 456 U.S. at 722). 
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examined the use of “expenses” and “attorneys’ fees” in other statutes, 
which, the court explained, shows that “[Congress understood] that the 
ordinary meaning of ‘expenses’ does not include attorneys’ fees.”160  Two 
categories of statutory drafting were recognized, the first being statutes that 
award both “expenses” and “attorneys’ fees,”161 and the second being 
statutes that explicitly define “expenses” to include “attorneys’ fees.”162  The 
language of § 145 does not fall into either of these categories. The court then 
considered the language of § 145 within the context of related statutes, 
examining whether “attorneys’ fees” had been awarded separate, or in 
conjunction with “expenses.”163  The Patent Act contains sections that either 
award attorney’s fees, or cross-reference to a section that awards attorney’s 
fees, such as § 285, which allows the court to award attorney’s fees in 
“exceptional cases.”164  This section not only allows an award of attorney’s 
fees, but is cross-referenced in other sections of the Patent Act.165  By 
omitting “attorneys’ fees” from its statutory language, § 145 “strongly 
 
 160  Id. at 1188. 
 161  See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §363(n) (2018) (“[A]ny costs, attorneys’ fees, or expenses 
incurred”); 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(1)(b)(vii) (2018)(“[R]easonable expenses and attorneys’ 
fees”); 12 U.S.C. § 1786(p) (same); 25 U.S.C. § 1401(a) (2018) (“[A]ttorney fees and 
litigation expenses”); id. § 6673(a)(2)(A) (“excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees”); 15 
U.S.C. § 77z-1(a)(6) (2018) (defining the amount of attorney’s fees and expenses awardable); 
38 U.S.C. § 4323(h)(2) (2018) (“[R]easonable attorney fees, expert witness fees, and other 
litigation expenses”); Use of “expenses” to include attorney’s fees, despite intentionally 
creating the distinction between the two within these statutes, would be “an inexplicable 
exercise in redundancy.” W. Va. Univ. Hosps. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 92 (1991). 
 162  See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 5005(b)(2)(B) (2018) (“[E]xpenses (including costs and 
reasonable attorney’s fees and other expenses of representation).”); 10 U.S.C. § 2409(c)(1)(C) 
(2018) (“[A]ggregate amount of all costs and expenses (including attorneys’ fees and expert 
witnesses’ fees).”); 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(2) (“[A]ggregate amount of cost and expenses 
(including attorneys’ fees based on actual time expended).”); 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (2018) 
(“[J]ust costs and any actual expenses, including attorney fees . . . .”); 29 U.S.C § 1370(e)(1) 
(2018) (“[T]he costs and expenses incurred in connection with such action, including 
reasonable attorney’s fees . . . .”); 30 U.S.C. § 938(c) (2018) (“[A] sum equal to the aggregate 
amount of all costs and expenses (including attorney’s fees) . . . .”); 41 U.S.C. § 4705(d)(1)(C) 
(2018) (“[A]n amount equal to the aggregate amount of all costs and expenses (including 
attorney’s fees . . .).”); 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(e)(9) (2018) (“[R]easonable expenses 
incurred . . . including a reasonable attorney’s fee.”); 2 U.S.C. § 396 (“[R]easonable expenses 
of the contested election case, including reasonable attorneys fees . . . .”).  Use of “attorneys’ 
fee” as an explanatory term that modifies “expense” shows that “Congress viewed [the terms 
“expense” and “attorneys’ fees”] as distinct tools in its toolbox of recovery items,” and courts 
should avoid interpreting statutes in a way that creates redundancy.  Nantkwest, 898 F.3d at 
1189. 
 163  Nantkwest, 898 F.3d at 1189–90. 
 164  See 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2018) (“The court in exceptional cases may award reasonable 
attorney fees to the prevailing party.”) (emphasis added); id. § 297(b)(1) (“[R]easonable costs 
and attorneys’ fees[.]”) (emphasis added). 
 165  Id. § 271(e)(4) (cross-referencing § 285); id. § 273(f) (cross-referencing § 285). 
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suggest[s] a deliberate decision not to authorize such awards.”166  The court 
also considered past judicial use of the term “expenses,” noting that it “does 
not ordinarily include attorney’s fees.”167 
IV. THE BEST APPROACH—ATTORNEYS’ FEES NOT INCLUDED 
A. The Shammas Court’s Application of the American Rule is 
Wrong 
The Shammas court relies on a faulty concept of what the American 
Rule is and how it functions.  In Shammas, the court relies on Alyeska 
Pipeline’s articulation of the American Rule, stating that “‘the prevailing 
party may not recover attorneys’ fees’ from the losing party.”168  The 
Shammas court uses this definition to explain that, because § 1071(b)(3) does 
not have a prevailing party requirement in its text, it does not implicate the 
American Rule whatsoever.  As a result, the statute need not use specific and 
explicit language to shift attorney’s fees.169  The lack of reference to a 
prevailing party in no way means that the American Rule is not implicated; 
the American Rule is implicated wherever a statute purports to shift 
attorneys’ fees from one party to another.170 
The Hardt Court accurately defined the American Rule as the default 
under which “[e]ach litigant pays his own attorney’s fees, win or lose, unless 
a statute or contract provides otherwise.”171  This is the definition that the 
Nantkwest court relied upon.172  By even considering the possibility that “all 
expenses” in both § 1071(b)(3) and § 145 would allow for recovery of 
attorney’s fees, the statute necessarily implicates the American Rule, as the 
statute would be attempting to have one litigant pay another litigant’s 
 
 166  Nantkwest, 898 F.3d at 1190 (citing Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809, 
819 (1994) (declining to award attorney’s fees where the relevant section did not utilize 
explicit language to shift fees, while other sections of the statutory scheme used express 
language to shift fees)). 
 167  Id. at 1191 (quoting Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., Div. of Econ. & Med. Servs. V. 
Kistler, 320 Ark. 501, 509 (1995)). 
 168  Shammas v. Focarino, 784 F.3d 219, 222–23 (4th Cir. 2015) (citing Alyeska Pipeline 
Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 245 (1975)).  While the court was quick to reach for 
Black’s Law Dictionary to define “expenses,” it declined to consider Black’s Law 
Dictionary’s definition of the American Rule, which more accurately aligns with the 
Nantkwest and Baker Botts courts, among others.  American Rule, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
(10th ed. 2014) (“The general policy that all litigants, even the prevailing one, must bear their 
own attorney’s fees. The rule is subject to bad-faith and other statutory and contractual 
exceptions.”). 
 169  See Shammas, 784 F.3d at 223–24. 
 170  See supra Part II.D. 
 171  Hardt v. Reliance Std. Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242, 252–53 (2010); see supra note 168. 
 172  Nantkwest, 898 F.3d at 1184. 
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attorney’s fees.  In this context, neither of the statutes provide the specific 
and explicit statutory language that would be required to displace the 
American Rule. 
B. Granting USPTO Attorney’s Fees is Contrary to the 
Principles of the American Rule 
The Nantkwest court’s application of the American Rule to § 145 and 
its finding that the statutory language is not “explicit and sufficient” to 
displace the American Rule demonstrates that the rule remains a “bedrock 
principle” applicable to all statutes.173  The Shammas court relied on a narrow 
reading of Alyeska Pipeline to support the idea that the American Rule 
applies only to shifting fees from the prevailing party to the losing party.174  
In Alyeska Pipeline, the Court focused on the connection between the 
American Rule and the prevailing party simply because the appeal in 
question dealt with an award of attorney’s fees to a party who prevailed in 
the court below.  In the Court’s view, the prevailing party was “performing 
the services of a ‘private attorney general.’”175  But the Court was not making 
a broad proclamation defining how the American Rule is supposed to 
function. Instead, it was correcting an improper application of an exception 
to the American Rule by the court below.176  The Court has defined the 
American Rule as a default under which “each litigant pays [their] own 
attorney’s fees, win or lose, unless a statute or contract provides 
otherwise.”177  There is no requirement of either a winning or a losing party 
within this definition; all that is established is that when one party is paying 
the attorney’s fees of another party, a fee is being shifted, and the American 
Rule has been implicated. 
The Shammas court’s interpretation of the American Rule contravenes 
Chief Justice Warren’s three aims in Fleischmann: access, predictability, and 
 
 173  See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
 174  See Shammas, 784 F.3d at 222–23. 
 175  See Alyeska Pipeline Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 241 (1975).  The 
exception applied by the Supreme Court, known as the private attorney general doctrine, 
provides courts the discretion to award attorney’s fees to “a party who vindicates a right that 
(1) benefits a large number of people, (2) requires private enforcement, and (3) is of societal 
importance.” See Carl Cheng, Important Rights and the Private Attorney General Doctrine, 
73 CAL. L. REV. 1929, 1929 (1985).  This exception allows for the enforcement of public 
rights through private lawsuits.  Id. at 1929 n.1. 
 176  See Alyeska Pipeline, 421 U.S. at 246 (internal citations omitted) (“The Court of 
Appeals [after finding other American Rule exceptions inapplicable] held that the [prevailing 
party] had acted to vindicate “important statutory rights of all citizens . . . .” 
 177  See Hardt v. Reliance Std. Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242, 252–53 (2010).  For discussion 
of the exceptions to the American Rule, see supra Part II.C. 
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judicial administration.178  The Shammas court’s determination that the 
American Rule does not apply to § 1071(b)(3) offends all three aims.  Parties 
bringing civil actions are aware of the costs expected of them at the outset, 
but the inclusion of attorney’s fees adds a level of uncertainty that would 
dissuade meritorious trademark reexamination claims, not promote access to 
courts.  This is especially concerning when the attorney’s fees purported to 
be saved by the USPTO are infinitesimally small in comparison to the 
increased cost that would be shouldered by trademark applicants should the 
USPTO spread the burden.179  The decision to award attorney’s fees 
impinges on the ability of the applicant seeking reexamination to adequately 
prepare for the cost of litigation as a whole, and make informed decisions 
based on that information.  The Shammas court instead placed more burdens 
on applicants, who are left to wonder how much time and how many 
attorneys and paralegals will be assigned to review the reexamination.  An 
applicant cannot reasonably anticipate the total cost of the USPTO’s 
attorney’s fees. 
The Nantkwest court properly applied the American Rule to its analysis 
of § 145, which includes the same “all expenses” language found in § 
1071(b)(3) that the Shammas court analyzed. These statutes must be viewed 
in the context of the American Rule, and must be analyzed to determine 
whether there is reason to fee-shift that is explicitly and specifically stated 
by Congress.180  It is clear that none of the exceptions to the American Rule 
apply to either § 145 or § 1071(b)(3), as they are not securing any trust fund, 
common fund, or common benefit.181  Additionally, neither case involved 
misconduct or bad faith of the losing party.182  The only possible avenue to 
shifting attorney’s fees in both these cases is through “explicit and sufficient” 
statutory intent.183  In a vacuum, the Shammas court’s analysis of § 
1071(b)(3) may have been persuasive.  The generally understood 
connotation of “all expenses” could include attorney’s fees as a reward, and 
those attorney’s fees could be considered a part of the proceeding. But when 
Congress utilizes vague statutory language that could be generally 
understood to include attorney’s fees, the Supreme Court regularly declines 
to interpret such language as a catch-all.184  Interpreting vague statutory 
 
 178  See supra notes 53–54 and accompanying text. 
 179  See infra notes 219, 221 and accompanying text. 
 180  Nantkwest, Inc. v. Iancu, 898 F.3d 1177, 1184 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (en banc), cert. 
granted, 87 U.S.L.W. 3343 (U.S. Mar. 7, 2019) (No. 18-801). 
 181  See supra notes 48–50 and accompanying text. 
 182  See supra notes 51–52 and accompanying text. 
 183  See Baker Botts, L.L.P v. ASARCO, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2158, 2161 (2010). 
 184  See, e.g., Summit Valley Indus. v. Local 112, United Bhd. of Carpenters, 456 U.S. 
717, 721–22, 726 (1982) (rejecting 29 U.S.C. § 187(b)’s language of “shall recover the 
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language as sufficient to meet a “specific and explicit” requirement is 
inherently untenable.  The Shammas court sidestepped the requisite statutory 
construction for fee-shifting, reaching its own conclusion based solely on a 
“plain meaning” interpretation.185  By contrast, the Nantkwest court properly 
recognized that a “plain meaning” interpretation would be untenable since 
Congress has provided an extensive list of statutory references from which 
the meaning of “explicit and sufficient” can be derived.186 
C. Not Granting Attorney’s Fees Respects Congress’s Intent 
The Shammas court found that the American Rule does not apply to § 
1071(b)(3) because it does not refer to a “prevailing party” and contains 
language that could plausibly encompass attorney’s fees.187  While the 
majority cites tenuous supporting precedent,188 its failure to recognize the 
construction of the statute as a whole led the court astray.  In Key Tronic, the 
Supreme Court was tasked with interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B)189 to 
determine whether it provides for the awarding of attorney’s fees.190  The 
statute allows for the recovery of “any other necessary costs of response 
incurred by any other person consistent with the national contingency 
plan.”191  The Court concluded that because other sections in the chapter 
allow attorney’s fees awards192 while § 9607(a)(4)(B) does not, it would be 
inappropriate to presume that Congress intended to allow such recovery.193  
The Court rested its decision on the principle that when Congress uses 
language in one section of a statute but does not include it in another, it is 
 
damages by him sustained and the cost of the suit” as insufficiently specific and explicit); Key 
Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809, 818 (1994) (rejecting 42 U.S.C. § 
9607(a)(4)(B)’s language of “any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other 
person” as insufficiently specific and explicit). 
 185  The plain meaning rule applied by the Shammas court is anything but plain.  For 
further discussion, see generally William Baude & Ryan D. Doerfler, The (Not So) Plain 
Meaning Rule, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 539, 546–50 (2017); Maxine D. Goodman, Reconstructing 
the Plain Language Rule of Statutory Construction: How and Why, 65 MONT. L. REV. 229, 
236–41 (2004). 
 186  See generally supra notes 161–162 and accompanying text. 
 187  Shammas v. Focarino, 784 F.3d 219, 223, 227 (4th Cir. 2015). 
 188  Id. at 223 (citing Alyeska Pipeline Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 245 (1975), 
and Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 684 (1983)). 
 189  The Court refers to this statute as CERCLA § 107, but for clarity, the full citation of 
the statute will be used.  See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (2018). 
 190  See Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809, 814 (1994). 
 191  42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) 
 192  See id. § 9606(b)(2)(E) (referencing 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A), which defines “fees 
and other expenses” to include attorney’s fees); id. § 9659(f) (“The court . . . may award costs 
of litigation (including reasonable attorney and expert witness fees) to the prevailing 
[party.]”). 
 193  See Key Tronic, 551 U.S. at 818–19. 
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presumed to be purposeful.194 
The Shammas court made no reference to the numerous statutory 
provisions within the Lanham Act that specifically and explicitly allow for 
the recovery of attorney’s fees when considering § 1071(b)(3).  Within the 
Lanham Act, Congress created multiple sections that allow for the recovery 
of attorney’s fees, such as § 1116(d)(11),195 and §§ 1117(a) and (b),196 among 
others.197  Further, these sections conform with Congress’s intent to allow 
for the recovery of attorney’s fees only in “exceptional cases” where there 
have been “acts which courts have characterized as malicious, fraudulent, 
deliberate, or willful.”198  The language used in these sections are sufficiently 
specific and explicit to overcome the American Rule, falling under the 
Nantkwest court’s first category of statutory drafting,199 while the language 
in § 1071(b)(3) is not.  If the Shammas court had considered the existence of 
these sections of the Lanham Act, the court would have been hard pressed to 
wave away the fact that Congress had made clear when and under what 
circumstances it wanted to displace the American Rule.  The statutory 
construction of the Lanham Act makes clear that § 1071(b)(3) was purposely 
excluded from being a part of such distinction. 
The Nantkwest court considered Key Tronic in its analysis of § 145, and 
examined the larger statutory construction before concluding that § 145 does 
not allow attorney’s fees.200  Because of the existence of sections that either 
explicitly allowed attorney’s fees, or cross-referenced sections that did allow 
attorney’s fees, it would be near impossible to say that, despite specific and 
explicit language in other portions of the statutory construction, Congress 
still intended to include attorney’s fees by simply stating “all costs.”201  
 
 194  Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (“[W]here Congress includes 
particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, 
it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate 
inclusion or exclusion.”) (citation omitted). 
 195  15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(11) (2018) (authorizing recovery of a “reasonable attorney’s 
fee”). 
 196  Id. § 1117(a) (authorizing recovery of “reasonable attorney fees”); id. § 1117(b) 
(authorizing recovery of “reasonable attorney fee[s]”). 
 197  See, e.g., id. § 1114(2)(D)(iv) (authorizing recovery to include “costs and attorney’s 
fees”); id. § 1122(c) (authorizing recovery of “damages, profits, costs and attorney’s fees”). 
 198  See S. REP. NO. 93-1400, at 2 (1974). 
 199  See supra note 161 and accompanying text. 
 200  Nantkwest, Inc. v. Iancu, 898 F.3d 1177, 1190 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (en banc), cert. 
granted, 87 U.S.L.W. 3343 (U.S. Mar. 7, 2019) (No. 18-801) (“[T]he Supreme Court in Key 
Tronic found it persuasive that Congress included express provisions for fee awards in related 
statutes without including a similar provision in the statute at issue.”). 
 201  See supra notes 164–166 and accompanying text.  This is further bolstered by the fact 
that § 285 is cross-referenced by several sections in relation to patent litigation, but Congress 
explicitly chose not to include such cross-reference in § 145.  In a similar vein, it is unlikely 
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Congress could have either included the language found within these 
sections elsewhere to denote allowable fee-shifting, or cross-referenced to § 
285, but it chose neither.  The Nantkwest court properly held that § 145 is 
insufficiently specific and explicit to shift attorney’s fees in light of these 
considerations.  This holding is in line with precedent that properly ascertains 
Congress’s intent based on the entirety of the statutory scheme instead of 
failing to see the forest for the trees. 
D. USPTO Has Recently Attempted to Restrict § 145 Actions 
The USPTO’s attempt to recover attorney’s fees is a continuation of its 
attempt to hinder access to § 145 civil actions.  Not only this, the attempted 
interference is in contravention of Congress’s intent, as explained above,202 
and should be rejected until the time that Congress determines that displacing 
the American Rule in trademark and patent application civil actions is 
appropriate. 
In Kappos v. Hyatt,203 the USPTO attempted to restrict the evidentiary 
record of the district court in a § 145 action to what was reviewed by the 
PTAB.204  In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court rejected the 
USPTO’s argument and affirmed the Federal Circuit’s holding that Congress 
intended applicants to be able to introduce new evidence in a § 145 civil 
action so long as it does not violate the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 
the Federal Rules of Evidence.205  It is noted that, while judicial review of an 
agency decision is commonly limited to the record of the administration from 
which the appeal is derived,206 this principle is not applied to § 145 civil 
actions because they are de novo proceedings.207 
This endeavor to hinder § 145 civil actions is visible in the USPTO’s 
attempted use of 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv) to restrict the court’s 
consideration of § 145 actions.208  In BTG Intern. Ltd. v. Kappos,209 the 
 
that based on the language “all expenses of the proceeding,” Congress intended the fixed costs 
of a PTO attorney’s salary to be considered part of the proceeding, and shifted to the 
applicants on a pro-rata basis.  Whether the proceeding occurs or not, attorney salaries are 
still an expense incurred by the USPTO, regardless of whether § 1071(b)(3) or § 145 civil 
actions are commenced.   
 202  For discussion of Congress’s statutory intent, see supra Part IV.C. 
 203  566 U.S. 431 (2012). 
 204  Id. at 437. 
 205  Id. at 436. 
 206  See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (“In making the [determination], the court shall review the whole 
record or those parts of it cited by a party, and due account shall be taken of the rule of 
prejudicial error.”). 
 207  See BTG Intern., 566 U.S. at 438. 
 208  See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37. 
 209  No. 12-CV-00682, 2012 WL 6082910 (E.D.Va. Dec. 6, 2012). 
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USPTO argued that 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv) established that when a 
patent applicant fails to present to the PTAB an argument “specifically 
directed to the patentability of any specific patent claim,” the PTAB may 
determine a “representative claim” upon which the rest of the claims’ 
patentability will be assessed.210  As a result, this would, in effect, restrict the 
district court’s scope of review of a patent application in a § 145 civil action 
by only allowing consideration of the “representative claim” determined by 
the PTAB.  In another defeat for the USPTO, the court held that 37 C.F.R. § 
41.37 does not restrict the broad scope of a § 145 civil action.211  The court 
noted that although the rule allowed the consolidation of all claims into a 
single “representative claim” when an appeal is before the PTAB, that does 
not restrict the district court to the “representative claim.”212 
A proposed version of the Innovation Act213 included language that 
would repeal § 145.214  The repeal would shift all civil actions that would 
have been heard in the Eastern District of Virginia to the Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit.215  With this process, the Innovation Act would 
eliminate the de novo review that is allowed through § 145, and thereby 
remove any possibility to introduce evidence outside what was required by 
the PTAB at the time of application. This would tie the hands of appellants 
to the record of the PTAB, making it far more difficult to vindicate their 
rights.  This proposal was likely in response to the decision in Kappos that 
announced that applicants in § 145 civil actions can introduce further 
evidence than what was relied upon by the USPTO.216  The aversion to the 
established accessibility and flexibility that § 145 has allowed over the years 
has been present throughout, and it continues today. 
The attempted collection of attorney’s fees in § 145 civil actions came 
after the aforementioned maneuvers failed to provide the USPTO with the 
results it had sought.  According to the USPTO, the collection of attorney’s 
fees has always had Congressional blessing through the language of § 145, 
 
 210  Id. at *2. 
 211  See id. at *5–6. 
 212  Id. at *6. 
 213  H.R. REP. NO. 113-279 (2013).  The version of the Innovation Act that was 
successfully voted in the House to move to the Senate did not contain the proposed repeal of 
§ 145, signaling a lack of appetite for such a measure at the time. See H.R. 3309, 113th Cong. 
(2013). 
 214  H.R. REP. NO. 113-279 at 13 (proposing to repeal 35 U.S.C. § 145). 
 215  Id. (proposing to alter the language of 35 U.S.C. § 141, which would require all actions 
be heard by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit). 
 216  See supra notes 203–207.  The USPTO is not unfamiliar with lobbying Congress to 
enact legislation favorable to their preferred method of operation. See H.R. 6758 Extends 
Controversial USPTO Fee Authority, http://www.usinventor.org/2018/09/13/hr6758/ (last 
visited Sept. 24, 2019). 
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yet prior to 2013 the USPTO has never attempted to collect attorney’s fees 
under patent and trademark laws.217  The collection of attorney’s fees in this 
context would be far more detrimental that beneficial.  Although the USPTO 
could not provide an exact number of § 145 civil actions each year,218  the 
total attorney’s fees that the USPTO would recover would be minimal 
compared to the chilling effect that would result from patent applicants 
having to factor in the USPTO’s attorney’s fees in addition to their own 
litigation expenses.219  Regardless of the supposed small number of § 145 
civil actions over the years, allowing the USPTO to shift its attorney’s fees 
would merely complicate an alternate, and already more expensive,220 path 
to resolution should a patent applicant choose to do so.  This same approach 
can be applied to § 1071(b)(3); the attorney’s fees the USPTO would recover 
would be a drop in the ocean compared to the chilling of trademark 
applicants seeking a de novo civil action.221 
The USPTO has repeatedly attempted to hinder § 145 civil actions, 
whether it be through restricting the record that may be examined by the 
court, restricting jurisdiction of the court by narrowing the claims, or 
 
 217  Shammas v. Focarino, 784 F.3d 219, 230 n. 4 (4th Cir. 2015). 
 218  See Oral Argument at 19:19–20:10, Nantkwest, Inc. v. Iancu, 898 F.3d 1177 (Fed. Cir. 
2018) (No. 2016-1794), http://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov/default.aspx?fl=20 16-
1794.mp3 (the USPTO failed to provide the number of § 145 civil actions within the last 
twenty years, but estimates that there have been four to five § 145 civil actions in the past 
three years). 
 219  The Nantkwest court offers a conservative calculation of the possible impact of 
preventing the USPTO from collecting attorneys’ fees: assuming the USPTO litigates ten § 
145 civil actions each year, with an average attorneys’ fees cost of $100,000, the total USPTO 
expenditure would amount to $1 million per year.  Nantkwest, Inc. v. Iancu, 898 F.3d 1177, 
1196 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (en banc), cert. granted, 87 U.S.L.W. 3343 (U.S. Mar. 7, 2019) (No. 
18-801).  Assuming that the number of patent applications meets the USPTO’s projections, 
over 627,000, the attorneys’ fees costs incurred from litigating § 145 civil actions could be 
alleviated with an application fee increase of $1.60 per application.  Id.; see U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office, Fiscal Year 2018 Congressional Justification 11 (2017) 
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/fy18pbr.pdf (projecting 627,274 patent 
applications for the fiscal year 2018). 
 220  See 35 U.S.C. § 141 (2018) (excluding the language “all expenses of the proceedings 
shall be paid by the applicant”).  The choice to pursue a § 145 civil action as opposed to a § 
141 appeal already carries its own burdens for the patent applicant, allowing the USPTO to 
recover more miscellaneous expenses. 
 221  The number of § 1071(b)(3) civil actions each year is unavailable.  Assuming that the 
number of § 1071(b)(3) civil actions is similar to the number of § 145 civil actions, the same 
calculation can be done as in the Nantkwest court to estimate cost.  With the same conservative 
estimate of ten civil actions a year costing $1 million per year, and assuming that the number 
of trademark applications meets the USPTO’s projections, 610,000, the attorneys’ fees costs 
incurred from litigating § 1071(b)(3) civil actions could be alleviated with an application fee 
increase of $1.64 per application.  See U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Fiscal Year 2018 
Congressional Justification 14 (2017) https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ 
fy18pbr.pdf (projecting 610,000 trademark applications for the fiscal year 2018). 
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attempting to have the section repealed entirely.  When these attempts failed, 
and despite previously never requesting attorney’s fees, the USPTO 
attempted to collect attorney’s fees from a statute which required “expenses” 
to be paid by the applicant.222  Suddenly, after 170 years, and coincidentally 
after previous failed attempts to restrict §145, the USPTO has found meaning 
that allegedly had been present the entire time, but they were unable to see 
until recently.223  It appears that the USPTO would prefer to have greater 
control over § 145 actions than is allowed, and is uninterested in review and 
interference by the courts.224 The position of the USPTO is not only based 
on an improper interpretation of the language “all expenses” and, to a certain 
extent, reactionary to action by the courts, but also in contravention of 
Congressional intent, and should be rejected. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The American Rule has been embedded in our legal system for over 
200 years.  Over time, we have recognized exceptions to the “pay your own 
way” approach to attorney’s fees, and have respected Congress’s ability to 
displace the American Rule where it sees fit.  In the case of trademark and 
patent application civil actions, it is wholly improper for courts to find that 
the language that has been utilized in § 1071(b)(3) and § 145 would be 
sufficient to displace the American Rule.  Doing so is not only an affront to 
the principles of the American Rule and its goal to allow greater access to 
the legal system, but also disregards Congress’s presumed purposeful 
drafting schemes and statutory constructions.  The Supreme Court has 
granted certiorari in Nantkwest to settle this dispute,225 and the proper 
 
 222  35 U.S.C. § 145 (“All the expenses of the proceedings shall be paid by the applicant.”) 
(emphasis added).  The Supreme Court has explained that “shall” in statutory construction is 
“ordinarily ‘the language of command,’” and that when “may” and “shall” are both used in a 
statute, their ordinary meaning is that “may” is permissive and “shall” is mandatory.  
Anderson v. Yungkau, 329 U.S. 482, 485 (1947). 
 223  See Nantkwest, 898 F.3d at 1189 n.5 (“[I]t is unclear why it took the [USPTO] more 
than 170 years to appreciate the statute’s alleged clarity and seek the attorney’s fees that are 
statutorily mandated under its interpretation.”). 
 224  See Miller & Archibald, 92 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 498, 534 (2010) (“The 
[USPTO’s] interpretative rulemaking and legislative lobbying on Capitol Hill reveal the 
agency’s ultimate goal of making the [PTAB] for all intents and purposes the review-tribunal 
of last resort tantamount to the status of an Article III court[.]”); Miller and Archibald also 
posited that the USPTO would attempt to abolish district court review allowed by § 145 three 
years prior to the USPTO attempting, and failing, to repeal it through congressional lobbying.  
Id.; see supra notes 213–216 and accompanying text. 
 225  See Amy Howe, Justices Add Patent-Fees Case to Next Term’s Docket, SCOTUSBLOG 
(Mar. 4, 2019, 11:56 AM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2019/03/justices-add-patent-fees-
case-to-next-terms-docket/.  Andrei Iancu has recused from the case, and the Deputy Director 
of the USPTO, Laura Peter, has been substituted as petitioner.  The case is proceeding as Peter 
v. Nantkwest. 
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solution is clear: whether it be trademark application civil actions or patent 
application civil actions, unless Congress decides to amend the statutes in 
question, the Supreme Court should decline to allow for the recovery of 
attorney’s fees based on vague, ill-defined statutory language insufficient 
under Supreme Court precedent, which would do more harm than good. 
 
